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DRIVERLESS CARS and the MUCH DELAYED
TORT LAW REVOLUTION
Andrzej Rapaczynski1

Abstract
The most striking development in the American tort law of the last century was the quick
rise and fall of strict manufacturers’ liability for the huge social losses associated with
the use of industrial products. The most important factor in this process has been the
inability of the courts and academic commentators to develop a workable theory of
design defects, resulting in a wholesale return of negligence as the basis of products
liability jurisprudence. This article explains the reasons for this failure and argues that
the development of digital technology, and the advent of self-driving cars in particular, is
likely to force a comprehensive re-thinking of products liability, a large-scale return to
the principle of strict manufacturers’ responsibility, and a host of other developments of
lasting historical and economic significance. The article argues that an integration of
manufacturing and insurance industries may be one of these developments.
One of the most remarkable technological developments in recent times is the rapid
progress of automobile technology. A host of safety improvements, beginning with seat
belts, through airbags, and finally a number of computer-assisted safety devices, such as
electronic stability control,2 rear view screens, lane-departure and blind-spot warnings,
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influenced, indeed inspired, by Guido Calabresi’s path-breaking scholarship in the law of torts generally,
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“The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that ESC saved over 2200
lives among passenger vehicle occupants during the three-year period from 2008 to 2010.” John Villasenor,
Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for Legislation, BROOKINGS INST.
(Apr. 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/04/products%20liability%20driverless%20ca
rs%20villasenor/products_liability_and_driverless_cars.pdf (citing NAT’L CENTER FOR STATISTICS &
ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REPORT NO. DOT HS 811 634, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS: ESTIMATING LIVES SAVED BY ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL, 2008-2010, (Nov. 2012)),
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self-parking, and others,3 combined with the electronic global positioning system, have
already transformed the experience and safety of modern automobile use. But the truly
revolutionary stage is just around the corner: within a few years, digital technology will
make completely driverless cars a reality, and no longer a matter of science fiction.
Indeed, one research group forecasts that ”by 2035, sales of autonomous vehicles will
reach 95.4 million annually, representing 75% of all light-duty vehicle sales.”4
It does not take great expertise to observe that the regime of tort liability will be an
important factor in determining how quickly and in what form driverless cars will be put
on the market, how much they will cost, etc. Given the potentially enormous significance
of this effect for a whole host of very powerful interests, it is also not surprising that a
cottage industry of lawyers, law professors, and think tanks is quickly developing to
assess the situation and provide advice.5 But what is perhaps somewhat surprising is that
3

See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REPORT NO. DOT HS 811 182, THE LONG-TERM
EFFECT OF ABS IN PASSENGER CARS AND LTVS, at 47 (July 2010), available at http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812069.pdf (antilock brake systems reduce the overall crash-involvement rate by
6% in passenger cars and by 8% in light trucks and vans); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
REPORT NO. DOT HS 811 115, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMBER REAR TURN SIGNALS FOR REDUCING REAR
IMPACTS, at 12 (Apr. 2009) (change in color of rear turn signals from red to amber reduces rear impacts by
5.3%).
4

Autonomous Vehicles Will Surpass 95 Million in Annual Sales by 2035, NAVIGANT RESEARCH (Aug. 21,
2013), http://www.navigantresearch.com/newsroom/autonomous-vehicles-will-surpass-95-million-inannual-sales-by-2035. A more conservative estimate by Boston Consulting Group forecasts that one in ten
cars sold worldwide in 2035 could be fully automated. 12 Million Driverless Cars to Be on the Road by
2035-Study, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/08/autos-bcgautonomous-idUSL1N0UN2GQ20150108.
There is also a difference of opinion among experts whether the cars of the future will be entirely selfdriving and to what degree drivers will retain control over the various electronic safety devices in their cars.
According to some reports, only Google anticipates future cars to be entirely self-driving, with no steering
wheels or brakes, while “other car companies view self-driving technology as a complement, not
replacement, for the driver.” Joe Nocera, Look, Ma, No Hands!, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/opinion/joe-nocera-look-ma-no-hands.html?_r=0 .
5

A partial list of publications on this subject includes: Sophia Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay,
Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 101 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379697; Andrew P. Garza, Look Ma, No Hands!:
Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 581 (2012), available at
http://newenglrev.com/volume-46-issue-3/v46b3garza/; Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and
Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2012),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss4/4/; Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A.
Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1321 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss4/6/; Kyle Colonna,
Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 81, (2012), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325879; NIDHI KALRA, JAMES M. ANDERSON,
MARTIN WACHS, RAND CORP., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES,
UCB-ITS-PRR-2009-28, CAL. PATH RESEARCH REPORT ( Apr. 2009); JAMES M. ANDERSON, NIDHI
KALRA, KARLYN D. STANLEY, PAUL SORENSEN, CONSTANTINE SAMARAS & OLUWATOBI OLUWATOLA,
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2014), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-1.html. A growing number of newspaper articles also
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the attention of commentators has been focused primarily around the idea that products
liability law can have a seriously deleterious effect on the adoption of the new technology.
Indeed, although an occasional voice can be heard that the tort system is capable of
handling the new challenge of driverless cars,6 most commentators argue for one or
another method of insulating the manufacturers from the impact of products liability law
and propose various forms of immunity for the industry, including preemptive federal
legislation.7
I do not deny that the existing tort law may slow down technological progress and that a
reasonable reform is necessary. But I would like to focus not on what tort law can do for
driverless cars, but on what they can do for the tort law, i.e., on their revolutionary
potential for bringing new life and innovation into the products liability law. As I will
show, the law regarding civil responsibility for the enormous cost of accidents involving
industrial products – and perhaps the cost of automobiles accidents above all8 – has
regressed in comparison to where it had been heading several decades ago, and the
advent of driverless cars is likely to force us to retrace its wayward ways and provide an
occasion to rethink the whole issue of the proper basis of liability for accidents due to the
use of industrial products. Several propositions for which I shall argue in the rest of this
paper should help us realize why this focus may allow us to address some of the most
significant issues concerning the direction of future tort-law development.
First, under the present circumstances, the extent of potential liability connected
with the introduction of the driverless cars is actually much smaller than that to
which car manufacturers would have been exposed if the tort law in the area of
products liability had not evolved as dramatically as it did in the last thirty years
or so by abandoning the widespread judicial and legislative effort of the previous
deal with this issue: Douglas Newcomb, Will Lawsuits Kill the Autonomous Car?, MSN (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://editorial.autos.msn.com/ blogs/autosblogpost.aspx?post=577eb20f-399d-4124-a245-2a42b032f94c;
Chris Nichols, Liability Could Be Roadblock for Driverless Cars, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Oct/30/liability-driverless-car-transovation-google/; Dan Strumpf,
Liability Issues Create Potholes on the Road to Driverless Cars, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323854904578264162749109462.
6

Garza, supra note 5.

7

Cf. Colonna, supra note 5 (advocating liability limits); Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 5 (advocating car
owners’ liability); Kevin Funkhouser, Note, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products
Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 458–62 (2013) (advocating a no-fault
compensation scheme).
8

According to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in 2013, auto accidents were responsible
for 32,719 deaths and 2.3 million injuries. NAT’L CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN, REPORT NO. DOT HS 812 101, 2013 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW (Dec.
2014), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812101.pdf. The economic cost of these accidents was estimated
at $242 billion, NAT’L CENTER FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN,
REPORT NO. DOT HS 812 139, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2013, http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812139.pdf, – a figure higher than the combined federal expenditures for education,
environment, energy, foreign affairs, and science and technology.
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decades to make strict liability into the governing principle of manufacturers’
responsibility. Indeed, the wholesale return to negligence as the principle
governing liability in the area of design defects has in fact dramatically decreased
the liability of car manufacturers for most of the huge human and property losses
directly traceable to potentially avoidable automobile accidents.
Second, had the products liability system stayed with the strict liability principle,
especially if the courts and/or legislatures had developed it in a proper way to
vindicate the promise of using market incentives in order to improve the safety of
industrial products, this fact, while making the car manufacturers’ liability larger
than it is now in absolute terms, would have also provided infinitely greater
incentives to invest in research and production of safer driverless cars and, if
anything, dramatically accelerated their introduction.
Third, while consumers have an independent incentive to care for their own
safety, the market for safety may be quite imperfect because of the consumers’
notorious tendency to misvalue the expected cost of future accidents, and this
market failure is likely to delay the adoption of new automobile technologies. A
well designed strict liability regime, by contrast, would combine a much more
comprehensive system of compensation for the victims of car accidents with a
significant change of the car buyers’ access to safety information, better
incentives to adopt new safety devices, and greater willingness to pay for them.
Strict liability would also enable (indeed force) car manufacturers to put
significant pressure on drivers to purchase automobiles with better safety record,
and thus further lessen their resistance to the adoption of driverless cars.
Fourth, one of the most important reasons why the present products liability
regime is apt to retard the introduction of safer driverless cars is not that the
manufacturers’ liability is too high in absolute terms, but because it is to a
significant extent arbitrary. The tort system, as we know it, leaves the ultimate
decision concerning the extremely complex technical questions about how safe
automobiles and other products can and should be made to twelve more or less
randomly chosen people, who are, if anything, pre-selected for their lack of any
specialized knowledge or the ability to understand the complex issues involved.9
Because this process is not only arbitrary, but also extremely costly, judges have
introduced various defenses, such as “state-of-the-art,” designed to insulate
defendants from some of the vagaries of a jury trial, but these defenses also allow
the manufacturers to shift onto consumers much of the cost that the manufacturers
are in the best position to avoid. When such defenses are less likely to apply, as in
the case of new and very novel products, of which driverless cars may be the best
example, the manufacturer becomes open again to unpredictably large verdicts for
the consumer.
9

An entertaining, as well as instructive, exposition of the vagaries of the American jury system is presented
in Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 Yale L.J. 994, 995ff (1978).
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For these and other reasons that will become clear in the further course of the argument,
the advent of driverless cars provides a great opportunity to reconsider the development
of products liability law in the last few decades, reassess its effects, and examine the
roads not taken that, in today’s changed conditions, could produce significantly better
results. Indeed, the advent of self-driving cars is likely to force such reconsideration.
The early promise of strict liability
Much of the history of tort law in the 19th century was characterized by the increasing
dominance of negligence as the main, indeed nearly exclusive, principle of liability for
unintentional harms. By contrast, the later progress of tort law, until the last decades of
the 20th century, seemed to signal a gradual replacement of negligence with various nofault schemes and a transition to strict liability as the dominant principle of tort
responsibility.10 More generally, the apparent promise of strict liability for the allocation
of responsibility for the huge cost of accidents generated by the modern “American way
of life” seemed in tune with the broader acceptance of social insurance as the 20th-century
way of dealing with all kinds of adversity affecting individuals, be it unemployment,
poverty, health problems, or old-age drain on savings and family resources.
The early major penetration of strict liability into the traditional negligence regime
occurred in the field of workplace accidents. While it has been claimed that the
negligence regime, by placing the burden of no-fault accidents on the victims, had been
introduced as a form of subsidy for the increasingly dominant industrial interests,11 the
reason why its abandonment started in the area of workplace accidents had originally
more to do with an inherent jury bias of the negligence system against the industry: once
an injured worker’s case could go to the jury, the employer, especially a large corporate
employer, had next to no chance of winning the verdict. Faced with this reality, judges
developed various doctrines – above all assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule –
that in turn left the employee essentially with no tort recourse against the employer.12 It is
this judicially introduced form of “reverse strict liability” that was replaced by modern
workers’ compensation schemes.
Be that as it may, strict liability did permanently replace negligence as the principle
governing work-related accidents, and an administrative scheme of compensation, backed
by a greatly expanded regulatory apparatus on both state and federal levels, largely
10

Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 963 (1957); W i l l i a m L . Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
11

The main proponent of this view was MORTON J. HORWITZ, IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
12

This kind of unhappy judicial correction of the juries’ inherent anti-corporate bias, usually resulting in at
least equally unjust legal bar against plaintiffs’ recovery, is also most likely at bottom of the famous
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Goodman case, in which Justice Holmes set the notoriously flawed “Stop, look,
and listen” rule. 275 U.S. 66 (1927)
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replaced court-administrated case-by-case adjudication. But workers’ compensation
remained merely another exception from the general dominance of negligence in the
American tort law until another, very differently motivated movement arose in the wake
of World War II to make strict liability into a judicially-administered principle governing
manufacturers’ liability for the harms caused by their products. Ever since Justice
Traynor, in his famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Fresno,13 proposed abandoning negligence as the principle governing manufacturers’
responsibility, strict liability was seen by many as promising radical improvements in
several important dimensions.
1. On the most general level, strict liability was seen as backed by a superior economic
theory, placing the incentive to invest in research and the implementation of safety
improvements of mass-produced goods on the parties in the unique position to
undertake them, and to undertake them to the socially optimal extent.14 Manufacturers,
in this view, have by far the best access to information about the safety of their
products, the best technical expertise necessary to assess the areas of possible
improvement, and the best ability to devise new technological solutions to safety
problems. On top of this, they also have access to the capital necessary for the
implementation of all the safety decisions. As a result, they were seen by the
proponents of a shift toward strict liability as the cheapest cost avoiders with respect
to most accidents resulting from the use of modern industrial products, so forcing
them to internalize all the costs of product-related accidents was seen as giving them
the right incentive to use their ability to conduct a proper cost/benefit analysis of the
various safety measures and to implement them in the most efficient manner.
2. A particular advantage of the strict liability regime was seen to lie in its ability to
create a well-functioning market for safety and to rely on its superior efficiency, as
compared to the “command and control” regime of negligence in which the courts,
often lacking proper expertise and subject to a completely different incentive
structure, have the last word on what safety precautions should be undertaken by the
parties engaged in productive activities.
3. The strict liability regime was believed to be especially effective in stimulating the
right amount of safety research -- something that the negligence regime is nearly
completely unable to police. Because courts cannot credibly decide what investments
in research are ex ante justified by the necessarily very imperfect assessment of future
scientific and technological innovation, “state of the art” is a standard negligence
defense. Consequently, while a manufacturer can be found liable for not
13
14

150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).

While the rudiments of the economic theory of strict liability are already present in Justice Traynor’s
opinion in Escola, its full development was mostly provided by scholarly work in the wake of the Escola
decision. By far the most important contribution in this area has been the scholarship of G. Calabresi,
culminating in his THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970).
I indicated already that I am deeply indebted to Calabresi’s work. In a way, I am trying to vindicate here
some aspects of it that had not been sufficiently well understood.
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incorporating the most recent technology in its products, no court will ever claim to
know that some “reasonable” additional research investment in the past would have
produced a still unknown safety improvement that would have prevented the accident
in question. Thus, no manufacturer can ever be found to have been negligent for
underinvesting in safety research that would have moved the relevant frontiers of
science and technology beyond the “state of the art” at the time. The same problem
does not exist in strict liability, however, because under that regime, all research
investment decisions are decentralized, and lie with the manufacturers who make
various entrepreneurial guesses about future discoveries. The prospect of a reduction
in the costs of still-unavoidable accidents, which strict liability places on the
manufacturers, provides the required incentives for making the best decision, and the
resulting research investments by private parties under competitive market conditions
are much more likely to be efficient than any comparable judgments of state officials
in charge of “planning” the development of science in the future. Indeed, even if,
because of the absence of well-functioning markets, state officials may sometimes be
called on to make research investment decisions, the idea that such decisions could be
meaningfully made by judges or juries is simply too outlandish to be seriously
entertained.
4. According to Justice Traynor at least, the move from negligence to strict liability was
also designed to correct a malfunctioning of the tort system in which manufacturers
were seen as notoriously exposed to a systematic pro-plaintiff bias in jury trials.15
Much as had happened earlier in the area of employers’ liability, the move away from
negligence in product-liability cases was seen as not only more efficient, but also
more just, in the sense of delivering real-world outcomes more faithfully reflective of
the policies embodied in the letter of the law.
5. Another advantage of strict manufacturers’ liability, along both efficiency and
broader justice dimensions, was seen in the fact that it would nearly automatically
socialize the costs of accidents involving industrial products and spread them among
the consumers who directly benefited from their use. Strict liability would thus make
the manufacturers into the insurers of the users of their products, but like most
insurers, the manufacturers would then pass on the cost of this insurance to the
consumers, most likely by raising the initial purchase price of their products.16 With
15

Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (“In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference [of negligence] has
been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict
liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality
liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their
quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly.”).

16

It is very important to note, however, that other options, preserving to some extent the separation of the
sale of the product from that of insurance, are also possible. In fact, they may be instrumental in situations
in which the insurer may want to “purchase” the consumers’ safer use of the product by monitoring their
post-sale conduct and adjusting insurance premium to the post-sale safety record. I will argue, infra p. 32,
that this option is likely to dominate in a regime of strict manufacturers’ liability for the costs of auto
accidents.
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respect to some products (but not with respect to cars), this would introduce a new
compulsory insurance requirement and force consumers to purchase protection
against various harms not due to manufacturers’ negligence.17 How efficient such
compulsion could be would of course depend on how well the legal system
apportioned liability on the manufacturers, and how much the consumer himself can
do to reduce the cost of accidents involving a given product.18 But to the extent that
consumers often underestimate the chances of accidents involving otherwise very
desirable industrial products, they may also underestimate the full cost of the products
themselves, thus over-consuming them and taking on more risk than is optimal. If this
is the case, mandatory insurance may correct an important market failure.
Promise unfulfilled
In the wake of the Escola case, tort law seemed poised to revolutionize the way we dealt
with the growing cost of accidents in an industrial society and extend the principle of
strict liability beyond the limited field of workplace injuries, and into the much wider
area of responsibility for accidents involving the use of industrial products. Indeed, it
looked for a while like negligence would be relegated to an altogether marginal principle
of torts liability, much as strict liability had been a century before.
Yet, the most crucial development in the American tort law of the late 20th century was
not so much the spread of strict liability as its relatively quick rejection in the most
important areas of tort responsibility. In just a few years, with a few narrow exceptions,
the regime of liability for defective products largely reverted to the old order of
negligence-based responsibility, with judges and juries in every state again (often
inconsistently) telling manufacturers how to make cars, airplanes, printing machines,
medicines, lawnmowers, and kitchen appliances.
17

Because insurance is already compulsory in the automobile area, moving to strict liability would be less
of a “revolution” here. But it would make the manufacturer, rather than a third-party insurance company
into the “default” insurer. See infra p. 26. I will also argue later, infra p. 32ff, that the extensive
negotiations that usually accompany automobile purchase also open a possibility of more meaningful
negotiations concerning the terms of auto insurance under a strict liability regime.
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Even under a strict liability regime, manufacturers are not made liable for all accidents involving their
products, but only those for which they are the cheapest cost avoiders. Some accidents may be so unlikely
as to make it unwise to incentivize anyone to prevent them. With respect to others, consumers or other
parties may be in a better position to avoid them than the manufacturers, so exclusions or defenses may
have to be provided under any well-designed manufacturers’ liability system. The mandatory insurance that
a strict liability system imposes on the consumers will thus be inefficient if it shifts to the manufacturers the
liability for accidents for which they are not the cheapest cost avoiders.
But note that the available defenses to strict liability may also change over time. In, say, 1950, drunken
driving or speeding might have been causing accidents for which it did not make sense to hold the
manufacturers liable. But once the prospect of new technologies, say, devices not allowing a drunken driver
to start his car or controlling the speed at which a vehicle moves under certain road conditions, is on the
horizon (even if the horizon is still quite remote), it might make the driver no longer the cheapest cost
avoider with respect to these kinds of accidents.

9

There may have been various reasons why strict liability did not “take” in most areas of
product-related accident law. The fact that, under strict liability, industrial interests would
have to bear the cost of many non-negligently-caused, indeed largely unpreventable,
accidents related to the use of their products was clearly not without significance: the
industry had a huge stake in making sure that the reach of strict liability was drastically
limited, and a battery of highly paid experts, lawyers, and lobbyists was deployed to
nudge the law back into negligence. But there were also other important reasons, and I
want to begin by focusing on the doctrinal grounds for this retreat, primarily because it
can throw light on the problems our tort law faced in trying to come up with a
satisfactory delineation of no-fault tort liability, as well as help explain why the advent of
self-driving cars may quite dramatically change this situation, and perhaps usher in a
long-delayed rethinking of the way we deal with the growing social losses due to the use
of industrial products.
Defective jurisprudence of design defects
Perhaps the most important source of doctrinal confusion that largely prevented the
expected expansion of strict liability for accidents involving industrial products was the
complex, and mostly misunderstood, relation between strict liability and the concept of
the “defect.”
“Defect” was a straightforward enough idea in the early strict liability cases in which, as
in Escola, some manufacturing flaw in the product was the cause of the accident. It had
been obvious from the beginning that strict liability could not amount to “absolute”
liability: given the wide sweep of the standard concept of “but for” causation, clearly not
all harms “caused” by a product should generate the liability of its manufacturer. For
example, the fact that a knife, by virtue of its sharpness, would foreseeably cause fingers
to be accidentally chopped off, or even be used by people to settle accounts with their
enemies, was not enough to make the manufacturer liable for these kinds of harms to the
public. Something more was thought to be required, and this “something more” was a
feature of the product that would not only be a causal factor in the occurrence of the harm,
but also make the product, in a more robust sense, “responsible” for the injury –
something that, while perhaps not involving anyone’s negligence or intent, would still
identify an element of “wrongness” in the product that would justify making the
manufacturer bear the cost of the harm in question.
Thus, what justified making the manufacturer responsible for the harm suffered by Ms.
Escola, in the case bearing her name, was, according to Justice Traynor’s concurrence,
the fact that there was something obviously “wrong” with the bottle that exploded in her
hand. Indeed, the whole point of a Coke bottle is that it is supposed to allow the
consumer to enjoy the drink without anyone’s ending up in the emergency room of a
nearby hospital. So when the bottle exploded in the waitress’s hand, it was clearly
“defective”: it did not work the way such bottles were supposed to work. And this
remained true even if the manufacturer had not done anything wrong: the bottle at issue
was a useful product that had probably been produced and filled according to state-of-
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the-art technology (at least as of 1944) and, barring the res ipsa reasoning of the Escola
majority, there was no evidence of any unreasonable failure in the inspection process or
any other negligent action anywhere along the way of getting the bottle into the hands of
Ms. Escola. It is just a feature of mass-produced objects that even if everything is done
carefully and in accordance with the most modern technology, not all imperfections in the
manufacturing process can be eliminated at a reasonable cost, and a certain number of
products will malfunction, potentially causing serious injuries to the users. But the fact
that the bottle in Escola “malfunctioned,” i.e. did not behave in conformity with its own
design, was enough, for Justice Traynor at least, to label it “defective,” and make the
manufacturer responsible for the injury it had caused, without burdening it with
responsibility for absolutely every harm that may be related, no matter how incidentally
or remotely, to the use of its products. (The same bottle would not, for example, have
been thought “defective” if it had caused the same injury to Ms. Escola’s hand by having
fallen on her from a nearby balcony.)
Now what may explain a good part of the confusion in the strict liability doctrine that
followed was the deceptive clarity of the intuition that the bottle could be “defective,” i.e.,
that there could be something “wrong” with it, while no one was “at fault” (did anything
wrong) in producing it, bringing it to market, or using it in the way in which it was used.
By identifying the defect as non-conformity with the objective standard set by the
product’s design, the court could pinpoint some sort of fault-like feature in the product
itself, even if not in any party involved. The term “fault” was of course not used in this
context, but the language of negligence-like blame did come through in the very term
“defect,” as well as in the statement that the product did not work the way it “should”
have. The “wrongness” of the product thus justified making the manufacturer liable for
the harm caused by it, but at the same time limited the liability of the manufacturer to
only those cases in which such a “defect” (defined independently from the causation of
the injury) had been proven to exist.
The problem with this way of thinking was that its intuitive clarity quickly began to
unravel when the courts moved from “manufacturing” to “design” defects. In the former
cases, it was easy to say what was “wrong” with a defective product, in addition to the
fact that it caused an accident: the product itself was an exception in its line, something
“abnormal,”– it did not work the way it was supposed to according to its own design.
Once this is not the case, however, and a product does function in the way it was
designed, could it still be said to be “defective” because of something wrong about the
design itself, without eo ipso implying the fault (negligence) of the designer? To be sure,
it is often well known that a product, even if produced without any manufacturing defects
and used without any negligence, will result in a number of accidents that will inflict
significant harms on the consumers. The best kitchen knives will sometimes result in
chopped-off fingers, delicious butter will cause heart attacks, and wonderful vaccines that
save thousands of lives will sometimes cause, in a small and predictable number of ex
ante unidentifiable patients, the very disease they are supposed to prevent. But is there
something “wrong” with these products? Are they “defective?” Perhaps one could say
that there is something “wrong” with butter merely because it causes heart attacks, but
this façon de parler would not by itself point to the kind of “wrongness’ or “defect” that
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would justify making butter manufacturers liable for the heart attacks involved. Unlike a
manufacturing defect, which is defined as an exceptional, abnormal departure from a
standard defined independently from the injury caused by the product, the “defect” of
butter would simply reduce to the fact that it causes heart attacks, without specifying any
other standard of performance that could limit the manufacturer’s responsibility for all
the accidents “caused” by butter. Were we to go that way, butter manufacturers would
have to pay not only for those heart attacks, but also for the broken bones of people who
slipped on butter slides and other mishaps in which butter played some causal (“but for”)
role. Liability would soon extend beyond “no fault,” or even “strict,” and move into the
realm of “absolute.”19
So how can one define the concept of “defective design,” without marking butter as
“defective” because it causes heart attacks, and still capture a “problem” with the product
itself that does not imply the manufacturer’s negligence, but nevertheless points to a
feature that justifies making the manufacturer liable for the consequences?
This difficulty in the very concept of “design defect” appeared relatively early in the
development of products liability doctrine, and the early attempts to solve it quickly
veered in the direction of identifying design defect with “wrong design,” which could
only be understood in terms of the negligence of the designer. As early as 1965, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Section 402A), limited the seller’s liability to “product[s]
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” While the
Restatement also said that this liability persisted even if “the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his products,” in the context of design defects
the “unreasonably dangerous” formulation was very soon seen as bringing back the
concept of negligence and undermining the whole idea of strict products liability. Indeed,
California courts, which were the main laboratory in which the new products liability
doctrine was being worked out, resisted the Restatement’s assimilation of the idea of a
product’s defect to some form of “unreasonably dangerous” condition that would lead to
an implication of negligence on the part of the manufacturer.20 But despite the California
Supreme Court’s confidence that there was “no difficulty” in extending the original idea
19

To anticipate later discussions, we might note that the same argument does not apply to the other case I
cited above. Are the wonderful vaccines that save thousands of lives defective because they sometimes
cause the very disease they are supposed to prevent? The often cited example is that of the oral polio
vaccine. While there could not be a cleaner case of non-negligence, and there is a great temptation to
release the manufacturer from the liability for such mishaps, we shall see, infra note 48 and accompanying
text, that this is in fact a very good case for the presence of a “design defect” in a “true” strict liability
system. The consumer has no alternative and no means to protect himself, and if anyone is likely to
improve the product’s safety over time it is the manufacturer, who is therefore the clear “cheaper cost
avoider.” Unless the state wants to subsidize the manufacturer, the predicable, or “expected,” cost of the
accidents involved then should be included in the price of the product.
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The California Supreme Court, in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972), rejected the
“unreasonably dangerous” formulation and affirmed that “the necessity of proving that there was a defect in
the manufacture or design of the product” was enough to limit the liability of the manufacturer without
moving back toward negligence. Id. at 1162.

12
of product defect “to the full range of products liability situations, including those
involving ‘design defects,’"21 the same court, only a few years later, in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.22 and its progeny, started receding from this position and, despite some
protestations to the contrary, in fact brought the concept of design defect nearly all the
way back to that of the negligence of the designer.
The Barker court’s definition of design defect set up a two-pronged test.23 As we shall
see, the first prong, requiring a showing that the product causing injury “has failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner,” still contained a significant element of “true” strict
liability. However, the consumer expectations test was also said not to apply when the
consumer “would have no idea how safe the product can be made,”24 and in such cases,
the consumer could prevail only if the second prong applied, i.e. “if through hindsight the
jury determines that the product's design embodies ‘excessive preventable danger’ or, in
other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design.”25
To be sure, even this second prong is not exactly equivalent to requiring a proof of
negligence, at least not in its canonical version, because the “through hindsight” clause
eliminated the “state-of-the-art” defense inherent in the very concept of fault: even if “the
manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an attempt to design a safe product or
otherwise acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have under the
circumstances,” thus precluding liability under the traditional negligence standard,
Barker still imposed liability on the manufacturer if, perhaps because of some
technological advances between the time of production and the time of the trial, “the trier
of fact concludes that the product's design is unsafe to consumers.”26
But apart from thus revoking the state-of-the-art defense (and tipping the scales still
further toward the consumer by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
manufacturer27), the second prong of the Barker test of design defect effectively placed
product-liability law back in the realm of negligence. For the cost/benefit analysis at the
core of Barker’s second prong – weighing the design’s “benefits” against its “inherent
21
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Id. at 454 (citing John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
829 (1973).

25
26
27

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 455.

13
risk of danger” – is the gold standard of the negligence calculus, and the conclusion that a
design ultimately entailed an “excessive preventable danger” simply amounts to a finding
that, at least at the time of the trial, bringing the product to the market would involve an
act of negligence on the part of the manufacturer (even if the defendant itself may not
have yet had sufficient information when the product was in fact produced). Thus, even
though the hindsight clause does expand the manufacturer’s liability beyond the narrow
confines of its negligence, the requirement of proof that the design does not pass a
cost/benefit analysis test at the time of the trial makes this departure insignificant in terms
of developing a viable doctrinal basis (theory) of true no-fault liability. An analogy may
be helpful here: much as respondeat superior, by holding a non-negligent employer liable
for his employees’ negligent actions, did not amount to any significant theoretical
advance over the standard doctrine that required a proof of someone’s negligence, neither
does the second prong of Barker move beyond the idea that failing the negligence
calculus is the foundation of the manufacturer’s responsibility.
Torts, contracts, and the short life of consumer expectations
But what about the first prong of the Barker test which, with its evocation of the warranty
law’s notion of consumer expectations, seems to be in line with the manufacturing defect
doctrine of products liability, and opens the possibility of a strict liability basis of design
defect jurisprudence?
The meaning of the consumer expectations test in Barker was not entirely clear to begin
with, mainly because of the already explained limitation on its applicability in situations
in which the consumer “has no idea how safe the product can be made.” This formulation,
taken from John W. Wade’s influential 1973 article On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products,28 suggests that consumers can have reasonable expectations with respect to
a product’s safety only when they know “how safe [it] can be made,” and this in turn
suggests that they must be familiar with the technology involved in the product’s design.
In Wade’s own words, a product’s failure to pass the consumer expectations test simply
meant that the product was unsafe “because of a poor design or the failure to attach a
warning or suitable instructions”29 – about as close to the negligence standard as one
might come. Indeed, Wade himself is quite clear that this is how the test should be
understood,30 with the “consumer expectations” language providing at most a helpful
analogy, but not being “attuned to tort recovery”31 (which presumably requires a proof of
negligence).
28
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See supra note 24.
Wade, supra, note 24, at 830.
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“The simplest and easiest way, it would seem, is to assume that the defendant knew of the dangerous
condition of the product and ask whether he was then negligent in putting it on the market…” Id. at 834.
The only extension of the negligence basis of liability in this understanding is the already discussed
“hindsight” issue.
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Id. at 829.
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But even while citing Wade’s limitation on the applicability of the first prong of the
design-defect test, Barker clearly does not share Wade’s disparagement of the
appropriateness of the consumer expectations language in the context of manufacturer’s
tort liability. It was one of the truisms of the early post-Escola doctrine that strict liability
in the products area derived from the commercial warranty doctrine, and Barker, which
specifically affirmed the affinity between strict products liability and the concept of
warranties,32 intended to use the tried and true no-fault warranty standard in order to
define the seller’s liability for design defects.
The warranty context of the consumer expectations test is indeed quite enlightening here.
The commercial law of warranties provides relief to consumers in cases in which the
consumer expects a product to be suitable for its intended use, and the law makes the
manufacturer bear the risk of this not being the case. Thus, if one buys a TV set that turns
out not to work or distorts the colors of the picture, the manufacturer is required to repair
or replace it, even if the problem does not result from any negligence in design or the
production process. There may of course be things with respect to which a consumer
cannot have reasonable expectations, but the fact that such expectations are legitimate
does not mean that the consumer is familiar with the technology involved in the product’s
design or the production process: the expectation that a TV will have a picture or that
butter will not be stale in no way assumes that the consumer knows how TVs are made or
understands the details (or even the principles) of the cooling technology that keeps
butter fresh in most situations. What these “expectations” amount to is in fact not even an
empirical question about what the parties themselves really thought, but a contract
default position, i.e., a reconstruction of what rational consumers and sellers would have
been likely to agree upon if they had invested the time and effort required to contract
about this aspect of the transaction, specifying in particular what kinds of risks are to be
borne by the buyer or the seller. An empirical investigation into what consumers actually
expect (or what the manufacturers explicitly represent) may be of some relevance in this
context, but mostly as a piece of evidence with respect to how rational parties would
apportion the risks involved.33 It is the latter apportionment, rather than an empirical
inquiry into the parties’ state of mind, that the warranty law prescribes as a default.
Thus, so far as Barker intended to extend to the design-defect area the warranty law’s
standard of consumer expectations, which had already been used previously to define
manufacturing defects, the first prong of the Barker test did indeed constitute an attempt
to define design defects in a way that preserved the idea of strict liability, and did not
resort to requiring a proof of negligence. The contracts context of the warranty concept
32

“This initial standard [consumer expectations test], somewhat analogous to the Uniform Commercial
Code's warranty of fitness and merchantability (Cal.U.Com. Code, § 2314), reflects the warranty heritage
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does of course have some special features that are not fully applicable in torts situations.
In particular, the extent to which commercial law is willing to exempt the parties from the
privity requirement is narrower than in the products liability area, and there may be some
important public policy consequences of this difference.34 But the distance between
contract and torts is less in the products liability area than in most other parts of accident
law, where the parties to an accident do not know each other and had no opportunity to
negotiate their relative risks and responsibilities. Even though modern tort law opens
manufacturers to liability with respect to third parties, including not only a secondary
purchaser, but also a bystander with no contractual relation in the consumers’ chain of the
product in question, the original attraction of the warranty concept in the products
liability area was due to the fact that, while the idea of hypothetical ex ante negotiations
between parties to a torts suit is, in most cases, a not very helpful exercise in pure fiction,
the underlying reality of the products liability situations does involve real contracts
between buyers and sellers, which often (especially in car sales!) involve rather extensive
negotiations. For this reason, the question that the warranty law asks is the same as the
one strict products-liability law should ask: if the original transaction between the seller
and the consumer of the product had been fully negotiated, how would rational parties
have distributed the risks involved in the use of the product? An answer to this question,
instead of focusing on negligence, would point to considerations involving the parties’
relative ability to lower the expected cost of accidents and to bear the remaining risks
involved, with the liability for accidents that do happen placed on the “cheapest cost
avoider,” i.e., the party who is ex ante in the best position to optimize the costs in
question.35 As in the warranty area, actual consumer expectations (especially when they
are clear) may be taken as good direct evidence of what one side at least may believe to
have been actually agreed upon, or as some indirect evidence of what the parties might
have agreed upon in an ideal bargaining situation, thus providing a very attractive, but not
conclusive, token for the underlying economic reality.
In the wake of Barker, California lower courts did begin to use the consumer
expectations test to sustain the idea that manufacturers were indeed strictly liable for
design defects of their products. Perhaps the most interesting of these cases was West v.
Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc.36 in which both the trial and the appellate courts
affirmed the applicability of the consumer expectations test to a case in which the
plaintiff suffered toxic shock from using tampons produced by the defendant, without
34
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requiring any specialized medical knowledge on the part of the consumer, and basing the
decision on the simple fact that “an ordinary consumer of tampons would not expect to
become seriously ill from their use.”37
But whatever intellectual potential may have been contained in the first prong of the
Barker’s test was never fully realized, and the doctrinal opening created by Barker was
quickly closed in subsequent cases, nearly without a trace in most states, and to a large
extent in California as well. Indeed, as early as 1994, in Soule v. General Motors
Corporation,38 the California Supreme Court itself effectively emasculated the consumer
expectations test by an extremely restrictive reading of its applicability, de facto
transforming its remaining trace into a rarely applicable form of a res ipsa loquitur proof
of negligence. Perhaps not coincidentally – and I will have more to say about this later39
– much of this retreat took place in cases dealing with automobile accidents.
Soule was a rather straightforward “crashworthiness” case. The plaintiff, who was hurt in
an automobile collision, claimed that her car had a design defect that was responsible for
her ankle injury. The trial court gave the jury instructions on the Barker test and the
defendant appealed, claiming that the consumer expectations prong was inapplicable in a
complex design-defect case of this kind. The state Supreme Court in Soule accepted the
defendant’s position.
Soule’s conclusion that the “complexity” of the design makes the consumer expectations
test inapplicable misconceived the basic idea of the Barker test. The consumer
expectations test must of course set some limits to the manufacturer’s liability. The most
obvious one is that the product meets the test because the consumer understands that there
are certain dangers implicit in the product’s use with respect to which the manufacturer is
not the cheapest cost avoider. The already cited example of the risk of heart attacks from
37

The courts in West clearly also believed that the defendant was in fact negligent, and they allowed a
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butter consumption is a good case in point. While butter clearly causes heart attacks in
some people, trying to “improve” its “design” is not seen as the best (cheapest) way of
avoiding such accidents. Indeed, many people can consume butter quite safely, and those
under threat are themselves the cheapest cost avoiders: they can identify themselves as
potential victims, have periodic cholesterol and blood pressure tests, control the amounts
they consume, undertake other standard precautions (including the use of substitutes), etc.
There may also be other types of cases in which consumers do not have any legitimate
expectations with respect to some safety aspects of a product, not because it is clear that
the consumer, rather than the manufacturer, is the cheapest cost avoider, but because it is
in fact unclear who is in a better position to avoid. This may perhaps be in some cases
related to the complexity of the product, but the main reason for this type of situation is
that the product is too new or a certain use is not common enough for the parties to form
a standard set of expectations as to who should bear the risks involved. While liability in
such cases cannot be determined by the consumer expectations test, Barker’s move
toward an essentially fault standard in its second prong may not have been necessary
even in those situations: it was still possible to uphold the principle of strict liability by
simply instructing the courts to engage in a still more searching inquiry as to who is in
fact the cheaper cost avoider, i.e., an inquiry into whether future design improvements or
consumer’s use modifications offer the best hope of lessening the cost of the accidents
involved.
As we know, this was not to be; instead, in the second prong of its test, Barker moved in
the direction of requiring a proof of fault in the design. But what really spelled the end of
strict liability in design defect cases was Soule’s further reduction of the consumer
expectations test to a standard that was applicable only in the simplest of cases, in which
an ordinary consumer sufficiently understands the design of the product to know that it
can, and should, be made safe enough to avoid the accidents of the kind that affected the
plaintiff. In such cases, the Soule court says, we can simply dispense with expert
evidence and the explicit cost/benefit analysis of the second prong of Barker test that are
required to prove fault in the usual case of a more complex design.40 But what this means
is that a product’s failing the consumer expectations test is now sees as simply amounting
to a self-evident flaw in the design; in other words, Soule reduces the consumer
expectation test to a res ipsa loquitur finding of fault, and no longer any no-fault liability.
The examples given by the court make this emasculation of the first prong of Barker
explicit: “[T]he ordinary consumers of modern automobiles may and do expect that such
vehicles will be designed so as not to explode while idling at stoplights, experience
sudden steering or brake failure as they leave the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in
two-mile-per-hour collisions.”41 In such obvious cases, says the court, “the defect is
40

“In some cases […], ordinary knowledge […] may permit an inference that the product did not perform
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apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of … ordinary
consumers,”42 and despite Soule court’s cursory adherence to the rejection of the
Restatement’s “unreasonable danger” language,43 the very concept of “defect” comes to
be again inextricably associated with the intuitive sense of faulty design.
Soule’s misidentification of “defect” with “fault” in the context of the consumer
expectations test is perhaps the clearest sign of the judicial retreat from strict liability
jurisprudence. Indeed, the fact that manufacturers’ “are liable in tort only when ‘defects’
in their products cause injury” means for the Soule court that “manufacturers are not
insurers of their products.”44 But this is the exact opposite of what a defect implies. As
we have seen, the concept of defect was introduced to limit the scope of manufacturers’
liability. Still, despite the superficial association of defect with a failure of some sort, the
“wrongness” of a defect was never supposed to have “negligence” implications. Instead,
the very heart of the true strict liability doctrine was the identification of the defect with
the idea of the manufacturer’s being the cheapest cost avoider with respect to the type of
accident in question, and the placing of liability on the party in the best position to avoid
such accidents in the future. Thus, the presence of a “defect,” did not imply that the
manufacturer did anything wrong, but only that improvements in manufacturing (and
perhaps marketing), including those that are still unknown and involve technologies not
yet discovered, rather than some future modifications in the behavior of the consumer,
were seen as the best hope of reducing the cost of similar accidents in the future. The
whole point of strict liability is that until such improvements succeed, the manufacturer
should be made into an insurer with respect to the type of accidents in question – indeed,
being an insurer is the very essence of what it means that the manufacturer is liable
without fault.
Deeper sources of doctrinal failures
With Soule and its progeny, design defect jurisprudence has turned around 360 degrees
and returned to its starting point of full-fledged negligence-based liability, with judges
and juries again having the last word on how to build safe cars and other products, and
manufacturers being told that they would be fully protected from design-defect liability
for any accidents that may be caused by their “state-of-the-art” machines. Perhaps
surprisingly enough, the legal academe, which had played such an important role in
opening the way to replacing negligence with a more market-oriented strict products
liability regime, barely noticed the quick demise of this opening, and did next to nothing
to prevent or reverse it. Part of the reason for this may have lied in the fact that the job of
translating the novel ideas advanced in Justice Traynor’s Escola concurrence into a viable
judicial doctrine that would have grounded a workable regime of products liability may
42
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have turned out to have been objectively much more difficult than most judges and
scholars had originally expected. Indeed, even if confusion played some role in this
doctrinal failure, and even if special interests may have also contributed to the same
result, focusing on the more objective difficulties will help us understand why the
prospect of self-driving cars is potentially such a significant landmark on the way to
another rethinking of the principles underlying products liability in the future.
The original proponents of strict liability had argued that the ease of application was
going to be one of its principal advantages, and that it would significantly lower the costs
of adjudication.45 The main reason for this claim was the true observation that the most
time-consuming, error-prone, and hence also the most costly, part of traditional torts
adjudication was the finding of the presence or absence of fault, involving as it did
complex investigations concerning the precautions actually undertaken by each party and
an evaluation of them in light of what would be “reasonable” to do under the same
circumstances. Under a strict liability regime, it was believed, this whole exercise would
be dispensed with, and the much less problematic finding of causation would be all that
was necessary to assign liability.
This belief turned out to have been quite naïve. The assignment of liability in any system
of case-by-case adjudication, even assuming that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding
causation have been proven to be true, was obviously going to require an additional
decision whether the product involved was “defective,” so that the defendant should
indeed be held liable for the plaintiff’s injury. As I have explained, the reason for this was
that basing liability on causation alone would have made manufacturers “absolutely”
liable for all the accidents that would not have happened without some involvement of
their products, and any limitation on this potentially huge liability had to come from an
additional finding of a defect in the product involved.46 But in most design-defect
situations, this determination turned out to be extremely complicated as well, indeed
much more difficult than a finding of negligence, and well-nigh impossible to handle
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effectively by a jury of twelve lay people, typically chosen, at least in part, for their
ignorance of nearly all of the issues involved.
Part of the difficulty may have been the already discussed lack of intuitive clarity in the
novel concepts needed to apply the doctrine correctly. While the legal concept of
negligence may also be significantly more complicated than the vague idea that laymen
tend to associate with it, juries were at least familiar with the concept. But both the
laymen’s and judges’ intuitive associations with the concept of a defect were too closely
tied to negligence, and were mostly confusing with respect to its proper meaning in the
context of strict-liability doctrine, where a product’s “defect” resolved to identifying the
manufacturer as the cheapest cost avoider with respect to the type of the accident in
question.
Being essentially an economic term of art, the concept of the cheapest cost avoider also
needed to undergo some “translation” to make it a viable part of legal vocabulary.
Calabresi himself defined it as referring to the person in the best position to make the
relevant cost/benefit analysis and to act on it,47 but, perhaps not surprisingly, this
operationalization never penetrated into the language of the law. The courts, having made
a valiant effort to define the cheapest cost avoider by reference to “consumer
expectations,” were quickly sidetracked by the fault-sounding implications of this
concept. Perhaps the simplest way to operationalize the idea at stake would have been to
ask the decider to identify the party who was most likely to be able to bring about safety
improvements in the future, even if such improvements were not yet possible and even if
we could not as yet specify them with any degree of precision. In other words, the
relevant question is: Do we expect technical improvements in the design and/or the
manufacturing process to be the best way of lowering the future cost of accidents of the
type at issue, or do we expect such improvements to come from a more skillful or better
calibrated use by the consumers,48 from medical advances in predicting or treating the
injuries,49 or perhaps from some other inventions or behavior modifications?
To pose this question is to see immediately that the problem is more deep than just the
absence of conceptual clarity. The answer may not only be very complex, but also require
significant expertise, going well beyond anything expected of either juries or legallytrained deciders. Even for an expert familiar with the technical issues involved, there may
be a large area of uncertainty about the prospects of future technological progress, and
the judgment in question may be more a matter of policy choice, perhaps even a bet, than
47
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an application of some established principles of knowledge. Indeed, while determining
who is the cheapest cost avoider is very different from deciding whether a given
technology is “state-of-the-art,” it is a task that also has a historical dimension and the
answer may change over time depending in part on technological change. In 1950, for
example, drunken driving, grossly excessive speed, etc., might have been causing
accidents for which it did not make sense to hold the manufacturers liable. But once the
prospect of new technologies, say, devices not allowing a drunken driver to start his car
or ones controlling the speed at which a vehicle moves under certain road conditions, is
on the horizon (even if the horizon is still quite remote), it might make the driver no
longer the cheapest cost avoider with respect to these kinds of accidents.50
At the time when the idea of strict liability started to penetrate the torts doctrine, the area
of car accidents was in fact one in which pinpointing the cheapest cost avoider was a
particularly perplexing task, and the concept of “crashworthiness” at the heart of the
controversy in Soule, may nicely illustrate the uncertainty and the stakes involved.
Suffice it to say that a policymaker in charge of the applicable legal and regulatory
framework could very well have looked to both the manufacturer and the consumer for
significant future reductions in the enormous cost of accidents involving the use of
automobiles. Even a few decades ago, the speed of technological progress was fast
enough to give hope that technical improvements would someday make driving much
safer.51 At the same time, however, the ability of the drivers to mitigate the costs of auto
accidents was also indubitable: a huge proportion of accidents was due to drunk driving,
speeding, and other forms of poor driving, as well as perhaps to excessive reliance on the
automobile by the American public and the neglect of public transportation. In a judicial
context, retrying this issue in every case, with arcane and technical expert testimony
likely to be indispensable for every decision, as well as a complex interplay of various
liability claims and defenses reflecting the fact that both plaintiffs and defendants could
have a role in reducing the cost of the same type of accidents, clearly raised the prospect
of extremely costly and highly unreliable adjudication, in fact perhaps exceeding the cost
of determining the presence or absence of negligence.
For reasons such as these, the most farsighted advocates of strict manufacturers’ liability
proposed early on to follow the example of workers’ compensation in replacing judicial
determination by a special administrative procedure involving broad category-by50
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category, rather than case-by-case, determinations of the types of accidents for which
manufacturers would be strictly liable, and using a routinized assessment of damages to
replace the widely varying and often unpredictable, as well as biased, jury awards.52 But
even such an administrative scheme might have involved more difficult and controversial
liability determinations than the relatively simple procedure designed to deal with
accidents at work. Employers have much greater control over their employees’ behavior
than car manufacturers ever had in the pre-driverless-car days over the behavior of
drivers, pedestrians, and other parties injured by their products. The internalization of
workers’ injuries into the general cost of production thus looked much less problematic
than charging the car makers with most costs of auto accidents.
High price of abandoning strict liability
The disadvantages of a regime of strict products liability, particularly in terms of the cost
and accuracy of adjudication, had thus been very real (and obvious) before the recent
advances in digital technology moved the idea of self-driving cars from the realm of
science fiction to near-reality and made it much more likely that the manufacturers may
be seen as the cheapest cost avoiders with respect to a much wider range of accidents
than in the pre-digital age. Nevertheless, it is still worth noting that even before the recent
digital revolution, the price of reverting to negligence as the basis of design-defect
liability was also potentially enormous. Indeed, it is not implausible that many of the
safety devices now experimented with might have already been in common use by now if
auto manufacturers had been liable for accidents caused by their absence.
An example may give us an idea of the potential difference that could have been made by
sticking with a regime of strict liability: a simple and cheap device preventing a driver
from starting his car while intoxicated. This device has been available for many years,53
but outside of a narrow context of post-DWI-conviction,54 it is not in wide use anywhere,
despite the fact that as recently as 2012 drunk driving was still responsible for over
10,000 fatalities (31% of the total), i.e., one death every 51 minutes!55 To be sure, drunk
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driving is a criminal offense in every American jurisdiction, as well as a per se failure to
exercise reasonable care, which exposes the driver to serious tort liability. It is also a
subject of extensive public-education campaigns designed to lower its incidence.56
Nevertheless, incontrovertible evidence from many years of experience has shown that
both criminal and civil responsibility do not go nearly far enough to eliminate (or even
sufficiently reduce) the enormous cost of drunk driving. We also know that opposition to
the laws making installation of anti-drunk-driving devices mandatory (perhaps based on
the belief that responsible drivers do not need such devices) was strong enough to prevent
their enactment.57 Indeed, perhaps surprisingly, no court in the U.S. ever found a
manufacturer liable in negligence for a design defect arising out of the failure to install an
anti-drunk-driving device, despite the fact that (a) such devices have been technologically
possible for a long time, (b) the probability of a drunk driver’s causing serious harm to a
third party is ex ante very high, and (c) the cost of the device is low enough to make its
absence into a self-evident violation of the Learned Hand’s formula defining reasonable
care.58
Suppose then that the cost of alcohol-related accidents, which still amounts to the
staggering sum of $44 billion per annum,59 had been placed on the manufacturers. Isn’t it
likely that they would have come up with an effective disabling device much earlier,
invest in persuading the public that its use is appropriate, and indeed force consumers to
accept it by either making cars without it unavailable or by adding a large insurance
component to the price of a car not equipped with one?
This last possibility of front-loading the expected cost of drunk-driving by adding it to the
initial cost of a car without an anti-drunk-driving device points to an underappreciated,
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and often unnoticed, feature of strict products liability. Driving sober is of course a duty
of every car user, and failing to fulfill this duty is subject to both criminal and civil
sanctions in every state. Nevertheless, consumers may improperly discount the
probability of future driving accidents, and not value correctly the expected cost of
drunk-driving and of the penalties involved. They may therefore be unwilling to invest
enough in reasonable precautions, which results in a serious market failure in this area.
This market failure is what strict liability fixes, and the main reason why it works in this
context is not just because the manufacturers can directly prevent the accidents in
question by making a “better” car that no longer requires the consumers to take the
precautions they should, but do not, take. What makes the manufacturer into the cheapest
cost avoider in many cases of this kind is that (1) the manufacturer is much more
sensitive to market incentives than the consumers, and (2) when the expected cost of
accidents is shifted to it, the manufacturer is in a position to change the behavior of the
consumers by a simple device of converting the so-shifted future cost into a present
monetary outlay by the consumers. By including up-front the expected cost of drunk
driving in the price of a car without an anti-drunk-driving device, the manufacturer forces
the consumer to consider the real cost he is otherwise prone to ignore, and gives him an
effective incentive to purchase the device that will disempower him from driving “under
the influence.” Interestingly enough, this way of proceeding may often be more effective
than most attempts at direct compulsion through legal regulation, even when the penalties
for the reprehensible behavior (such as drunk driving) are very high.
The coming revolution
Whatever the costs and benefits of strict products liability for design defects of
automobiles may have been a few decades ago, the whole calculus is changing as we
speak because the advent of digital technology makes it ever more realistic that the
manufacturers are indeed the cheapest cost avoiders with respect to an overwhelming
majority of auto accidents (and perhaps with respect to accidents caused by a broad range
of other industrial products as well). There may still be quite a number of things that a
driver can do to avoid accidents, especially in the transition period during which many
non-self-driving cars are still on the road, or as long as the driver may be able to override
the various aspects of mechanized control. Moreover, only the driver himself can
calibrate the total amount of his car use, foregoing some trips, using public transportation
for others, and driving only when it is important enough to cover all the societal costs
involved, including the often underestimated expected cost of accidents. But the main
objective difficulty of picking the cheapest cost avoider for the purpose of determining
responsibility under a strict liability regime for auto accidents is increasingly behind us.
Indeed, it is quite clear that it is only a matter of time – and not a very long time at that6060
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- until various technological innovations in car design will eliminate driver error as a
major cause of accidents, and will do that at a cost well below that which it would take to
modify driver behavior through legal and educational means.
The establishment of a workable strict liability regime in the automobile area might thus
be a realistic possibility these days, no longer hindered by the whole gamut of doctrinal
and practical obstacles that contributed to its abandonment in the past. Moreover, given
the potential advantages of such a regime, be it in terms of increased safety, more
efficient administration, or a more equitable distribution of the social cost of accidents, it
might be very important to ask as early as possible what such a regime would look like
and what would be its legal, economic, and social consequences. This task may be even
more urgent in light of the fact that the question concerning the ability of the present torts
system to handle the introduction of self-driving cars, without unduly delaying it or
making it prohibitively costly, seems to be generating some anxiety among the experts
and the industry, and has already led to calls for legislative action designed to limit the
manufacturers’ exposure to unforeseeably expanded liability.61 If changes are to come,
we better get them right. And to get them right, we need to be much more clear about the
available alternatives, including especially the possibility of going back to a more
efficient regime of strict products liability.
Manufacturing and insurance
Developing the details of such a new comprehensive legal regime, capable of handling
what may be the most radical change in American tort law, goes well beyond my
ambitions (as well as ability) at this stage. Of necessity, I focus on the “big picture,”
without aspiring to more than adumbrating a few significant changes and pointing to
some directions of further development.
A move toward strict liability would generally make manufacturers into the insurers of
their products, at least with respect to a range of expected uses. The manufacturers would
then of course pass on the cost of this insurance to their customers. In the case of most
products, such a move would make the product significantly more expensive by forcing
the inclusion of mandatory insurance in the price of the product. In some sense, most of
the expected costs of accidents involving the product are of course a part of the product’s
cost to the consumer in any case: a truly rational consumer would clearly consider the
present value of such accidents when buying the product, and think of it as part of the
cost of the product itself. But consumers are in fact notorious in undervaluing such costs,
and a portion of them is also not borne by the consumer, but externalized through various
forms of private and social insurance, including employer-paid medical and disability
2020-1784150; Mike Ramsey, Nissan Speeds Ahead of Rivals with Plans for Driverless Car, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 29, 2015 8:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nissan-speeds-ahead-of-rivals-with-plans-forautonomous-car-1446121737. For longer-term estimates see the sources cited in supra note 4.
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coverage, Medicaid and Medicare, Social Security disability payments, etc. To the extent
that the consumer does not bear or does not properly value the expected cost of accidents,
they are also not properly taken into account in the consumer’s purchasing decisions,
constituting instead a form of subsidy for the product in question. By including the
expected cost of accidents in the very price of the product, strict products liability might
seriously affect the demand for various products, especially those that are relatively more
dangerous (and would thus be made significantly more expensive).
Mutatis mutandi, the same applies of course to automobile purchases as well, but the
situation here is also quite different because car use is one of the few activities with
respect to which insurance is already mandatory. In this sense, although the cost of
insurance is not included in the “price” paid to the dealer, most people already think of it
as part of the cost of owning an automobile. To be sure, auto insurance does not cover the
entire social cost of driving, and thus strict liability, by internalizing the entire expected
cost of accidents to the manufacturers, would genuinely affect (raise) the perceived price
paid by the consumers. But to the extent that strict liability might simply shift to the
manufacturer the initial responsibility for the already existing mandatory insurance, the
cost of which the manufacturers would then pass back to the consumer, the price of the
car from the point of view of the consumer would not change at all,62 indeed, in fact
probably fall, as self-driving cars are likely to be much safer than the traditional ones.
Nevertheless, the role played by auto insurance is also likely to change, perhaps beyond
recognition.
The main reason for mandatory auto insurance is probably the protection of third parties
from the negligence of the insured driver. But first-party insurance is also included in
most policies, even if some parts of it (e.g. damage to the insured’s own car) may be
optional or carry large deductibles. Indeed, a number of states, including New York, have
moved partly away from the third-party protection principle with respect to relatively
small claims, and entitled the injured persons to recover on a no-fault basis from their
own carriers, without having to bring a claim against any other party.63 Even then,
however, the insurance companies track the negligence regime by settling among
themselves and making the insurer of the negligent party, if any, cover all the damage up
62
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to the maximum policy amount.64 The premiums charged by the insurance companies are
then adjusted to the results of such settlements, as well as to the record of traffic
violations, and are thus sensitive to the driver’s negligence, even though factors unrelated
to negligence also affect the cost of insurance for an individual car owner.65 On top of
this, for drivers with sufficient assets to make them non-judgment-proof, there is an
additional, potentially very significant, personal exposure for negligently caused
accidents in which damages exceed the insurance policy amount. But crucially, with the
exception of accidents due to manufacturing defects, if damages from non-negligently
caused accidents exceed the injured person’s insurance coverage, the torts and autoinsurance systems leave them where they happen to fall.66
Much of this is bound to change with the advent of self-driving cars, regardless of how
the regime of torts liability is affected. Suppose for an instant that the fault regime for
design defects remains in place. Even under the present regime, not all car accident costs
are borne by the consumers. Whenever an accident victim or a driver-defendant, can
show – to a generally rather sympathetic jury – that the accident was even in part due to a
defect in the car, the manufacturer has to bear a share of the cost. But even if juries may
often assess greater damages against car companies than they might against individuals,67
the requirement of proving fault in all design defect cases assures that the proportion of
the total cost of automobile accidents paid by the manufacturers is still quite low. Still, as
drivers become less and less important, it seems inevitable that manufacturing or design
defects will be found responsible in a much greater proportion of cases – indeed, once
drivers play no role, the application of something like res ipsa loquitur may make the
manufacturers start picking up most of the costs that now still fall on the consumers and
other victims, de facto pushing the principle of torts responsibility ever closer to strict
liability. The fear of such a development may very well be at bottom of the already noted
recent calls for legislative interventions to limit the manufacturers’ exposure in the name
of not slowing down the introduction of driverless technology.68
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Whether or not an informal move toward de facto strict liability becomes entrenched in
legal practice, the role that insurance plays with respect to the safety of automobile use
will be very seriously affected. Although loss spreading, which is the essence of
insurance, theoretically diminishes an individual’s safety incentives; in fact, insurance
often does reinforce such incentives by making premiums adjusted to individual safety
record and investment in accident prevention. If the adjustment is reliable enough,
insurance prices the risk involved and converts the merely “expected” cost of future
accidents into a present expense for the insured. So if, as seems likely, consumers often
apply too high a discount rate to the cost of future accidents, mandatory insurance, like
strict liability (of which insurance is always a part69), may not only spread, but also
effectively lower, the cost of accidents.70 Still, as the driver’s ability to affect the
probability or the seriousness of the accident diminishes with the car’s taking over an
ever greater role in controlling its own behavior, the whole idea of mandatory
owner/driver insurance, at least insofar as its safety effects are concerned, becomes
problematic.
To begin with, the importance of the third-party protection aspect of car insurance clearly
diminishes, as accidents are increasingly less often – and ultimately probably close to
never – caused by the negligence of a driver. As long as the regime does not formally
move into strict liability, and as long as many drivers do not carry collateral life, medical,
and disability insurance, it may still make sense to require mandatory first-party
insurance. But by the same token, the safety impact of such a requirement, in terms of its
influence on consumer behavior, becomes attenuated.
To be sure, insurance premiums will not lose all significance with respect to providing
safety incentives for the drivers. Clearly, the transition to self-driving cars will be a
protracted process, so there will be a long time when many types of cars will co-exist,
and the role of the driver’s negligence will not be entirely eliminated overnight, if ever.71
More importantly, even when most driving is no longer done by the people in the car,
there are still other, non-negligence aspects of car use that have an impact on the number
and cost of accidents. For example, while the judicial standard of “reasonable care” is
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capable of reaching only certain aspects of driving behavior, other means, including the
pressure of properly attuned insurance premiums, may influence the amount of driving,
the willingness to pay more for cars with better safety record, and other aspects of car use
that have significant safety effects. But as long as insurance is purchased from
independent insurance firms, the impact of mandatory car insurance on some of these
aspects may become less significant because of potential conflicts between the insurers
and the manufacturers. The most obvious example is the insurers’ interest in decreasing
the cost of accidents by giving consumers an incentive to buy cars that have better safety
records. As manufacturers gradually become the cheapest cost avoiders with respect to
most car accidents, this aspect of insurance is of potentially ever greater importance.
Nevertheless, as long as less safe, but otherwise attractive and still “state-of-the-art,” cars
are not seen as containing a design defect, and as long as consumers underestimate the
expected cost of future accidents, manufacturers may be able to externalize onto the
consumer the increase in the expected cost of accidents involving such machines.72 If
insurers were to adjust premiums to the safety record of a car model (or even the
manufacturer’s overall record!), they would then correct the consumers’ market distortion
by converting the expected cost of future accidents into a present expense, and raise the
car price as perceived by the consumers, thus directly affecting the sales and profits of the
manufacturers. Not surprisingly, however, while insurers will sometimes lower the
premiums for cars with certain generic safety and antitheft devices,73 they are
understandably reluctant to get involved in “rating” particular car models and entering
into serious conflicts with car manufacturers whose sales may be seriously affected. The
reluctance to enter such conflicts may be particularly strong as long as the clientele of
mandatory insurance is essentially captive and not very well informed, which makes
spreading the extra costs more widely less troublesome than trying to lower them by
placing them on the parties who buy the machines with higher expected accidents costs.
The really interesting and potentially revolutionary changes in the role played by auto
insurance are likely to occur if strict liability is formally adopted as the principle
governing responsibility for car accidents. Indeed, strict liability would ipso facto
immediately transform the manufacturers into the insurers with respect to all accidents
for which they would be the cheapest cost avoiders, thus making the present form of auto
insurance immediately obsolete. While the situation might be somewhat complicated if
the defenses available to the manufacturers still cover a substantial proportion of
72
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accidents, let us assume a baseline situation in which totally self-driving cars are a
technological reality, so that an auto maker is in a position to limit the customer’s options
to one in which the consumer is a purely passive figure in controlling the car, and the
manufacturer is clearly the cheapest cost avoider with respect to – and thus initially
charged with – all the accidents that can happen as long as the vehicle is used in a normal
(expected) fashion and in accordance with the instructions.
Now it is, of course, possible that car manufacturers will not self-insure for the total
amount of their huge liability under such circumstances, and will outsource all or part of
their risk exposure coverage by purchasing insurance with a separate insurance industry.
However, even then the externalization of the excess risk imposed by less safe cars is no
longer likely to occur. The manufacturer will now be primarily liable for all accidents due
to a specific car model. If it wishes, it may be able to spread any such cost among its
various models, but whether it self-insures or buys insurance on the market, it will not be
able to impose any part of the expected cost of accidents involving its cars on other
manufacturers, and hence also not on car buyers generally, or on the public. What this
means is that the move to strict liability will correct an important market failure, and give
the manufacturers proper incentives to consider fully the whole social cost of each of
their machines.
Even under a strict liability regime, a separate insurance industry may have some
advantages over the manufacturers because of specialized skills, experience, access to
capital markets, etc. But car companies are probably big enough, as well as sufficiently
diversified among a large number of car models and a great variety of consumers, to
internalize all or most of the risks involved.74 Moreover, were they to purchase insurance
from an independent business, the latter’s cost of monitoring the behavior of the auto
makers would likely be much higher than the self-monitoring cost of the manufacturers
themselves, making self-insurance significantly less expensive. Finally, auto makers will
also enjoy another significant advantage over the existing insurance industry because of
their superior ability to negotiate the details of the insurance terms with their buyers,75
and to monitor each customer’s post-sale use of the purchased machine.
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detailed negotiations between the parties.
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Indeed, this ability to monitor the post-sale use of industrial products is in itself a very
important technological advance because the computerization involved is also likely to
enable the manufacturers to maintain a detailed driving record of each self-driving
automobile, registering (and perhaps storing in a general database) not just the amount of
driving, but also its quality, external conditions, passenger behavior, and a host of other
potentially relevant factors.76 Equally importantly, the new technology might allow the
manufacturers to control, and not just monitor, the owner’s use of the automobile,
including remotely enabling various extraordinary safety devices, disabling certain
features, or even immobilizing the vehicle whose owner defaults on his obligations77
under the sale/insurance contract. 78
It is not part of my subject here to consider the broader economic significance of the
potential integration of manufacturing and insurance industries that the introduction of
self-driving cars may bring about, although it should be noted that this may be a
development of historical proportions, especially if strict manufacturers’ liability extends
beyond the auto industry and, over time, is also applied to other products.79 What is of
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While not offered to the general public in this country, insurance companies In Great Britain already
provide an option for automobile owners to install a special “black box” in their cars that allows the
insurance company to monitor the time of day when the car is driven, the average speeds on different types
of roads, the number of miles driven, and even such factors as acceleration, braking, and cornering. The
insurance rates are then adjusted for these factors, resulting in significant savings for the more careful
drivers. See http://www.which.co.uk/money/insurance/guides/black-box-car-insurance/black-box-carinsurance-how-it-works/
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The importance of post-sale monitoring made possible by advances in digital technology goes of course
well beyond the automobile area, and may have still more significant results in some of these broader areas.
Think, for example, of guns that check the user’s fingerprints and do not fire unless the user is authorized to
handle the gun. Based on such considerations, an argument could be made that gun manufacturers are these
days the cheapest cost avoiders with respect to many injuries related to improper gun use and that making
them strictly liable with respect to such injuries would greatly lower the social cost associated with gun use
in the United States. I would like to thank Guido Calabresi for making me aware of the potential use of
digital technology to monitor post-sale gun use. For a more general discussion of the impact of digital
technology on post-sale contract enforcement, see Saifedean Ammous, Economics beyond Financial
Intermediation: Digital Currencies’ Possibilities for Growth, Poverty Alleviation, and International
Development, J. OF PRIV. ENTERPRISE, Fall 2015, at 19–50.
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To be sure, with the decreased importance of driving (and thus of what the buyer can do to increase the
safety of automobile use), some of the potential benefits of post-sale monitoring will be lost. But still, the
fact of its availability opens a very important window for the increased scope of pre-sale negotiations and
post-sale enforcement.
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I use the term “insurance” here in its proper economic sense, and abstract from the technical issue of
when a given practice qualifies as “insurance” under the applicable state laws. In the former sense, the fact
that a manufacturer will include the expected cost of accidents, for which it is strictly liable, in the price of
a product means that, in addition to the cost of capital, labor, and materials, the product’s price will now
include an insurance premium. But in a legal sense, the manufacturer’s obligation to compensate the
consumer for his accident damages derives from a tort-law entitlement of the consumer, and not from an
insurance contract between the two parties, so the transaction might not be regulated by the laws governing
insurance. Indeed, even to the extent that the consumer’s rights derive from the sale contract, they may still
be classified, from a legal point of view, as “warranties,” rather than “insurance.”
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more direct significance in the context of the present inquiry, however, is that the very
prospect of the auto makers’ selling insurance together with their machines is likely to
introduce very significant changes not only in the way car business is done, but also in
the legal framework governing the relationship between the manufacturers and the
consumers or other potential victims of auto accidents.
Will auto accidents remain part of the tort system?
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the prospective integration of auto manufacturing
and sales with the insurance business is that the extensive negotiations normally
accompanying car sales might now involve not only the kind of car, options, payment
structure, etc., but also the terms of the insurance included (by strict-liability law) in the
price of the product. The fact that the seller will also have a dramatically expanded ability
to monitor the buyer’s after-sale compliance will affect both the terms of the
insurance/warranties sold with the product and their effectiveness.80
To maximize their ability to modify drivers’ behavior in ways that would be expected to
lower the cost of accidents, even though the legal default would now place the initial
responsibility for these costs on the manufacturers, the sellers are likely continue the
present practice of separating insurance premiums, to be paid over time, from the basic
recovery of the manufacturing and marketing investment, thus not charging the whole
price of the automobile at the time of purchase. The insurance premiums might then be
tied to the amount of driving, as well as perhaps the conditions under which the car is
used, maintenance level, etc. A failure to adhere to some of these conditions by the owner
is surely not acceptable as a reason for modifying the default of the manufacturers’
liability, but the parties may now be able to replace the legal incentives provided by a
threat of torts or contracts liability with various market incentives and the already
mentioned private, maybe even mechanical, enforcement measures, such as an automatic
rise of the insurance premiums or the disabling of certain car features, perhaps even
immobilization or repossession of the car when the contractual use conditions are broken.
Beyond these relatively uncontroversial market arrangements affecting the safety of
industrial products, the rather detailed negotiations accompanying car purchase also open,
at least theoretically, the possibility of the parties’ negotiating in advance their

Be that as it may, making the manufacturer into an insurer in the economic sense is of primary significance
in the real world. As soon as the consumer does not need to purchase separate insurance from an
independent insurance company and is de facto, even if not de iure, insured by the manufacturer, the real
insurance business has now been integrated into the manufacturing business. To be sure, if the auto
manufacturers want to depart from the legal default and begin to negotiate the actual insurance terms with
the customers, the insurance law may at some point kick in again, or it might have to be adjusted to take
into account what has now become of the old “auto insurance” concept.
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Extensive data gathering related to people’s driving habits may also raise serious potential privacy
concerns which cannot be discussed in the present context.
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responsibilities for certain special type-of-accident damages, including potential
departures from the legal default of general manufacturer’s liability and replacing it with
some special obligations of either party or an assumption of additional risks with respect
to certain situations that the parties may consider to fit better their needs and capabilities.
There are of course dangers in these kinds of contractual departures from standard
liability defaults, especially when the contracts are between powerful corporate players
and members of the general public. Clearly, any agreements to release the manufacturers
of responsibility for their negligence would be presumptively invalid and call for very
careful scrutiny.81 Other agreements, which might be beneficial in a large number of
situations, but follow a general pattern that suggests not truly negotiable “boilerplate”
provisions, might make sense only in a highly (and skillfully) regulated environment
(which is unlikely to result from case-by-case-adjudication) and are likely to call for
legislative and/or administrative regulatory oversight.
Still, given the extensive negotiations that usually accompany car sales, contractual
departures from legal defaults may make sense in some cases. Imagine, for example, that
a prospective car buyer does not want a mere “means of transportation,” but is interested
in being able to override the self-driving defaults and assume personal control, be it
because the buyer’s intends to a make a special use of the car or has a preference for a
certain kind of driving experience. The manufacturer may be ready to offer such
customers a vehicle with, say, certain off-road capabilities, or something resembling an
old-fashioned sports car, rather than a self-driving equivalent of a family station wagon.
The parties may at the same time agree to release the manufacturer from liability for
certain types of accident damages when the owner is in control.82 Perhaps most
interestingly, the parties might wish to remove themselves, partly or totally, from the
vagaries of the judicially administered torts system and replace it by a simpler, cheaper,
and more expeditious system in which liability questions are quickly disposed of by a
special body applying broad categories across vary large swaths of accident damages, and
damages are paid in accordance with a pre-established schedule.
Contracting out of the expensive judicial resolution of private disputes is by now a widely
established practice; indeed, in many sectors, including banking, software, and others,
arbitration has, for all practical purposes, become the dominant form of dispute
resolution.83 Moreover, once the parties are successful at removing themselves from the
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The leading case concerning negligence disclaimers is Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d
441 (Cal. 1963). Virginia goes so far as to make such contracts generally unenforceable. Hiett v. Lake
Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992).
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See supra note 72. Even if this kind of assumption of risk is allowed, the manufacturer clearly could not
effectively disclaim liability with respect to accident victims who are not parties to the sales contract.
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judicial system, substantive legal defaults are also easier to modify or replace by various
contractual substitutes. The practice has generated its share of controversy, and some
commentators see it as exploitative with respect to consumers, as well as subversive with
respect to public policies in a number of areas.84 In particular, the idea of genuine
consumer consent to most of the usually non-negotiable waivers of legal defaults is
subject to serious questions that may undermine their legitimacy. The expansion of such
private agreements into the auto accident area, where life and death are often at stake and
where consumers may systematically misvalue the expected cost of various future events,
is likely to lead to even more serious problems. Thus, even if there is some room for a
“market” for dispute resolution mechanisms with respect to controversies between
consumers and large manufacturers, the imperfections of such a market, especially when
basic safety and colossal social losses are at issue, as they clearly are in the auto accidents
area, are obvious enough to require an extensive and well-designed regulatory
infrastructure.
The key point concerning such infrastructure is to rethink the way the torts system now
deals with the huge social losses due to auto accidents, and perhaps all accidents
involving industrial products. The very extent of these losses85 makes case-by-case
adjudication problematic, and the problem goes beyond the usual objection to the
expense of this form of resolution. Indeed, we have seen that in their struggle with the
concept of design defect, the courts were, on the whole, unsuccessful in designing
properly the very doctrinal framework for an effective handling of strict products liability
cases. To be sure, I also argued that this task will become easier in the era of self-driving
cars, when the new technology will make the manufacturers into the cheapest cost
avoiders in most auto accident cases. Continuing with judicial case-by-case
determinations of liability is therefore a distinct possibility. But a common-law
movement from the status quo toward a properly understood regime of strict liability is
likely to involve a very protracted trial-and-error evolution that would probably call for
serious legislative intervention in any case. Even then, the tort system is likely to be very
costly and produce less predictable outcomes than could be expected from a specialized
public or private body designed for the purpose of dealing with the auto accidents area.86
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I abstract here from the special problems generated by the device of contingency fee which allows tort
lawyers to take a 30-40% cut of the enormous sums involved in auto accident cases, most of which are
resolved without trial. LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY
COST AMERICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011); Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 357, 368 (2011). The huge special interest of
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We are, of course, not without experiences with administrative alternatives to the torts
system and the one that most readily comes to mind is the workers’ compensation regime
established in all states. There is clearly much to learn from this experience, but the
pitfalls of workers’ compensation history are also considerable. Liability determinations,
involving changing understandings of who is covered and for what injuries, have at times
led to controversial (and costly) extensions of coverage.87 Fraud is sometimes thought to
be a serious issue,88 and the way damages are calculated in most workers’ compensation
schemes, with compensation for various injuries often tied to rigid multiples of the
minimum wage, would probably be much less appropriate if applied to the auto accident
area.89 Decentralization of the workers’ compensation system, and indeed of the tort law
generally, is also to create problems in the auto accident area. Although some federalism
issues may arise in all local schemes of this kind, compensation of the victims of
automobile accidents by mostly out-of-state manufacturers would likely raise a serious
bias possibility.
Be that as it may, the most important objectives of an auto-accident compensation
scheme, whether set up directly under (state or federal) law or resulting from
comprehensively regulated market transactions, would be (1) to bring in genuine
expertise into the administration of the scheme; (2) establish a clear set of foundational
principles for deciding the basis of responsibility, and (3) produce a workable, yet
exhaustive, classification of accidents for which responsibility, at any given time, lies
with the manufacturer. To be sure, there will still have to be some procedure for
examining special circumstances of each particular case, including perhaps the possibility
of appealing individual decisions to a court. Most importantly, unlike workers’
compensation schemes, the auto-insurance scheme would have to contain a mechanism
for continuous reevaluation and an evolving improvement of the general rules in light of
new technologies and experiences. But essentially removing most complex factual
determinations from the resolution of individual cases, and replacing them with a
relatively straightforward application of general rules that would not be open to review in
the trial lawyers’ lobby in maintaining the status quo is also certain to be one of main obstacles to any
rationalization of the present system that would move away from judicial case-by-case determinations.
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each case, should be one of the main features of any efficient solution. A standardization
of damages would also dramatically lower the cost of resolving individual cases and
bring much greater predictability that would, in turn, allow the manufacturers to estimate
reliably their liability exposure and calculate the costs and benefits of various safety
improvements. However, given the much greater variety of the victims of auto accidents,
as compared to people injured in the workplace, it is unlikely that following the workers’
compensation schemes in tying compensation to minimum wage would do the job.
Conclusion
We need to leave for another day a fuller discussion of what the tort law might look like
in a couple of decades, after the impact of the digital revolution is felt throughout the
products liability area. But I have argued here that introduction of driverless cars will be
the first line of transmission through which the revolutionary potential of the new
technology will force important changes in the law of torts as it has been formed in the
last few decades. Above all, the new technology, by making manufacturers into the
cheapest cost avoiders with respect to most accidents resulting from the use of industrial
products, is likely to eliminate one of the main difficulties that the law had faced in the
past when it had looked like it was moving in the direction of strict liability as the main
principle of manufacturers’ responsibility. I have also argued that moving back to strict
products liability in the design defect area, which has been abandoned after the courts
misinterpreted the concept of “defect” and failed to develop a proper doctrinal and
institutional infrastructure of no-fault responsibility, far from having serious negative
consequences for the American industry, will in fact accelerate technical progress,
increase general safety, and open entirely new business horizons, such as an integrated
manufacturing and insurance industry. It will also bring more market mechanisms into
the area of consumer safety, speed up innovation, and ultimately make industrial products
less expensive.

